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Summary
This paper aims at analyzing the impact of corporate environmenral information disclosure from the
perspective of investors. To that end, we have collected environmental information disclosure data of
all Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2020 and controlled the impacts of annual reports on
investor response. We apply the Fama-French five-factor model to calculate the accumulative
abnormal returns of stocks during the event window period. Our results suggest that environmental
information disclosure can have a significant negative response among investors when we take the
impacts of annual reports into consideration. Moreover, we find that heavy-polluting companies and
companies with high institutional shareholding are more likely to have negative reactions from
investors. Notably, the negative response is found significant after the Ambient Air Quality Standard
was revised in 2012. Furthermore, high environmental expenditure and strict environmental
regulation will result in negative investor responses, while the political connection can alleviate the
negative impacts of environmental information disclosure. The results remain robust in different
ways. The findings suggest that listed companies may lack the incentive to engage in environmental
management and are reluctant to disclose environmental information. Consequently, the government
should formulate a mandatory disclosure policy and provide administrative support to environmentalfriendly companies. Besides, companies should improve innovation technology to cut down
environmental costs. Meanwhile, investors should be aware of the importance of corporate
environmental behaviors and realize the long-term benefits of environmental management of listed
companies.
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HQKDQFHPHQW RI LQYHVWRUV¶ LQYHVWPHQW FRQVFLRXVQHVV WKH UROH RI FRUSRUDWH
HQYLURQPHQWDO LQIRUPDWLRQ GLVFORVXUH LQ DIIHFWLQJ LQYHVWRU UHVSRQVH KDV UHFHLYHG
PXFKDWWHQWLRQDPRQJUHVHDUFKHUVLQUHFHQW\HDUV *LDQQDUDNLVHWDO,VWUDWHHW
DO<XHWDOD 7KHHQYLURQPHQWDOGLPHQVLRQKDVJUDGXDOO\EHFRPHRQH
RIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWV IRULQYHVWRUVZKHQHYDOXDWLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VFRUSRUDWH
VRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\SHUIRUPDQFHDQGDSSHDUVWREHRQHRIWKHLPSRUWDQWFRPSHWLWLYH
IDFWRUVLQPRGHUQVRFLHW\ )ODPPHU /HHHWDO /LXHWDO $VD
SUHUHTXLVLWHIRUFRPSDQLHVWRFUHDWHUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKWKHQDWXUDO HQYLURQPHQW DQG
DQ REOLJDWLRQ RI HDFK FRPSDQ\ WR SURWHFW WKH VRFLDO HQYLURQPHQW FRUSRUDWH
HQYLURQPHQWDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ &(5 LVEHFRPLQJDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIFRUSRUDWHVRFLDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ &65 DQGKDVGUDZQLQFUHDVLQJDWWHQWLRQ (GLQJDQG6FKROWHQV
/HH  )XNXGD DQG 2XFKLGD   $V QRQILQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ &(5 FDQ
FRQYH\ DWWULEXWHV RI D FRPSDQ\ WR WKH SXEOLF WKDW FDQ EH LQWHUDFWHG ZLWK ILQDQFLDO
LQGLFDWRUVWRHYDOXDWHFRUSRUDWHSHUIRUPDQFHWKHUHE\SURYLGLQJYDOXDEOHLQIRUPDWLRQ
DQG UHIHUHQFH IRU PDQDJHUV DQG LQYHVWRUV LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI VRFLDO YRODWLOLW\ DQG
HFRQRPLFXQFHUWDLQW\7KXVPDQ\LQYHVWRUVUHJDUG&(5LQIRUPDWLRQDVDQLPSRUWDQW
LQGLFDWRUZKHQPDNLQJLQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQV &DLHWDO)LVNDQG*RRG  
,QWKLVFDVHWRIXUWKHUVWUHQJWKHQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIHFRORJLFDOFLYLOL]DWLRQDQG
IDFLOLWDWH WKH LQYHVWPHQW HIILFLHQF\ RI LQYHVWRUV PDQ\ FRXQWULHV KDYH EHJXQ WR
IRUPXODWH OHJDO V\VWHPV WR UHJXODWH OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV¶ HQYLURQPHQWDO LQIRUPDWLRQ
GLVFORVXUH :KLOH &KLQD DGRSWHG WKH LQIRUPDWLRQGLVFORVXUHV\VWHP UHOHYDQWO\ODWH
DQG KDV JUDGXDOO\ HVWDEOLVKHG D IRUPDO VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ UHSRUWLQJ V\VWHP IRU
OLVWHGFRPSDQLHVVLQFHWKLVOHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHDQGLQIOXHQFHRIHQYLURQPHQWDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ GLVFORVXUH WR EH LJQRUHG E\ WKH PDMRULW\ RI &KLQHVH OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV
0RUHRYHU DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH Evaluation Report on Environmental Responsibility
Information Disclosure of Listed Companies in China DOPRVW  RI OLVWHG
FRPSDQLHV KDYH QRW UHOHDVHG WKHLU HQYLURQPHQWDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ UHSRUWV VRFLDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\UHSRUWVDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWUHSRUWVDPRQJWKHWRWDORI
OLVWHGFRPSDQLHVLQ&KLQDLQ +RZHYHUDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGuidance on building
'DWDUHVRXUFH Evaluation Report on Environmental Responsibility Information Disclosure of Listed
Companies in China (2020).
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a green financial system released by the People’s Bank of China and the other seven
departments in 2016, the Chinese government is making every effort to formulate
mandatory environmental information disclosure for listed companies. Moreover,
under China’s new commitments to carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon
neutrality before 2060, companies are expected to have to abide by more stringent
regulator standards and bear higher environmental protection costs, which is
undoubtedly a huge challenge for China’s listed companies. Previous research have
also demonstrated that with the degradation of environmental quality 2 and the
enhancement of environmental protection awareness of investors, CER information
disclosure can inevitably have significant effects on investor response by influencing
financial performance, risk management, and social attention of listed companies
(Horbach, 2012; Zhou et al., 2018; Beji et al., 2020; Long et al., 2020). Therefore,
driven by policy requirements and social concerns about the environment, it is of
both scientific interest and highly policy relevance to analyze the effects of the CER
information disclosure on investor response for corporate sustainable development
and improvement of China’s capital market efficiency.
As more and more managers integrate CER activities into their business
operations over the past decade, CER has aroused great interest from regulators and
academics. In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on CER
information disclosure and investor response. Many researchers hold the view that
CER information disclosure can reduce the risk level, facilitate innovation activities,
and improve corporate reputation, thereby attracting investors and enhancing their
investment intention (Albuquerque et al., 2019; Mayberry, 2020; Beji et al., 2020;
Lončar et al., 2020; Hernández et al., 2020). However, there still exist views and
research indicating that CER information disclosure can have no effects or even
negative effects on investors’ decisions. They maintain that engaging in
environmental behaviors means higher environmental costs which may lower the
company’s profitability from the resource-constrained perspective (Li et al., 2017;
Verbeeten et al., 2016; Deswanto and Siregar,2018). While previous research always
focus on specific environmental disclosure events, which leads to insufficient
research samples. Moreover, when evaluating the impacts of environmental
information disclosure, some researchers have not excluded the influences of
2

According to the data released by the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 80% of people live in
areas where air pollution exceeds the WHO guideline limits. Moreover, millions of people globally lack adequate
available water and consequently suffer from multitudes of preventable illnesses. Data resource:
https://www.who.int/
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corporate annual reports. Furthermore, the time when companies disclose their CER
will also exhibit significant impacts on investors (Choudhary et al., 2015; Edmonds
et al., 2017). In this paper, therefore, we collect a relatively larger research sample
and control the possible impacts of the releasing time of CER. Also, we exclude the
influences of corporate annual reports on investors. Specifically, (1) We collect
environmental information disclosure data of all Chinese listed companies from
2004 to 2020, which is a relatively comprehensive sample, thus drawing more
general conclusions. (2) We include companies that only publish financial reports as
the control group and eliminate the impacts of annual reports. Moreover, we take the
releasing time of CER and corporate financial reports into consideration and control
their impacts in our regression model. As investors are presenting considerable
importance in determining firms’ CER policies (Ng and Zheng, 2018; Albuquerque
et al., 2019), this paper analyzes the impact of CER information disclosure from the
perspective of investors’ responses. To that end, Fama-French five-factor model,
which shows the highest explanatory power of the assets returns from theory and
practice (Fama and French, 2015; Jareno et al., 2018; Bertomeu et al., 2018; Cox and
Britten, 2019), is used in this paper to measure investor response when discussing
the relationships between CER and investor response, thus making up for the
limitations of the pricing models in previous literature and describes companies’
characteristics more comprehensively.
By analyzing the impact of corporate environmental information on investor
response, we find that the disclosure of environmental information tends to have
significant negative impacts on the investors when we controlled the impact of
corporate annual reports, which decreases the investor’s investment intention and
firm value. This study further shows that heavy polluting companies and companies
with higher institutional shareholding are more likely to be negatively affected by
investors significantly when disclosing environmental information. Moreover, the
negative effects are found significant after the Ambient Air Quality Standard (AAQS)
policy was implemented in 2012, as the AAQS policy results in higher
environmental expenditure and environmental violation risk. We then explore the
influential mechanisms of investor response to environmental information disclosure.
We confirm that high environmental expenditure and strict environmental regulation
will result in negative investor response, while the political connection can alleviate
the negative impacts of environmental information disclosure. The negative
relationship between environmental information disclosure and investor response
3

survives a series of robustness tests. The results of our study will provide evidence
for the government to formulate policies on environmental regulation and mandatory
information disclosure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes
the literature on CER and puts forward the hypotheses. Section 3 constructs the
specific model, the data collection, and the variables. Section 4 reports the empirical
results and the robustness tests. Heterogeneity tests are carried out in Section 5.
Section 6 further analyzes the specific mechanisms of the impact of environmental
information disclosure on investor response. The final section summarizes the main
conclusions and policy implications.

2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Many pieces of research have suggested that the environmental dimension
seems to be one of the most important aspects for stakeholders when evaluating a
company’s CSR performance. As a prerequisite for companies to create relationships
with the natural environment and an obligation of each company to protect the social
environment, which represents the targets of sustainable development in operation
and production, CER appears to be one of the important competitive factors in
modern society (Flammer, 2013; Cai et al., 2015). In recent years, researchers have
demonstrated that environmental responsibility can have positive influences on
investor reactions. Specifically, much of the research has emphasized that CER
information disclosure can reduce the risk level, facilitate innovation activities, and
improve corporate reputation, thereby attracting investors and enhancing their
investment intention (Albuquerque et al., 2019; Mayberry, 2020; Beji et al., 2020;
Lončar et al., 2019; Hernández et al., 2020).
Firstly, CER behaviors exhibit significant influences on reducing companies’
financial risk and increasing firm value by improving information transparency and
risk management level (Cai et al., 2015; Albuquerque et al., 2019; Mayberry, 2020).
Moreover, Oikonomou (2012) finds that companies that engage in environmental
behavior are associated with lower levels of financial risk during times of moderate
social volatility. Further, according to the risk-reduction hypothesis, CER
engagement may have a negative association with company risk due to
insurance-like protection (Cai et al., 2015; Beji et al., 2020). Therefore, disclosing
CER information can reduce corporate risk and provide market appeal to investors,
4

thus exerting positive impacts on investor response.
Besides, CER can have a positive impact on investor response by promoting
corporate innovative activities and enhancing financial performance. Concretely
speaking, to participate in CER management and have positive environmental effects,
companies need to create new products or new technology to complete
environmental protection targets, thereby promoting corporate technological
progress and cost-saving innovations (Horbach, 2012; Lončar et al., 2019; Kraus et
al., 2020). More importantly, as environmental-protection technologies may enable
companies to reduce unit production costs and enhance sales, in the long run
companies investing earlier in CER may have greater financial advantages, such as
the improvement in ROA and ROE, which would make the stocks of the listed
companies more attractive to investors (Flammer, 2015; Lee et al., 2016; Zhou et al.,
2018; Singh et al., 2020; Fu et al., 2020).
Last but not least, corporate reputation and goodwill get significantly promoted
with the fulfillment of CER. According to social identity and social exchange
theories, participation in social responsibility can promote corporate image and
consumer satisfaction, as well as brand attachment and brand trust, thus enhancing
the consumer brand passion, purchase intention, and price premium, which can have
positive reactions among investors and bring large financial profit to the company
(Wang, 2018; Gilal et al., 2020). Moreover, as consumers increasingly expect to be
empowered in corporate management, the environment and community involvement
behaviors can positively affect product market perception, improve consumers’
autonomy-need and competence-need satisfaction (Kull and Health, 2016; Tao, 2020;
Bardos et al., 2020). Such effects are conducive to forming a virtuous circle of
environmental behavior and investor response of the companies (Jo, 2014; Kunz,
2020; Long et al., 2020), which can be beneficial to raise corporate comprehensive
capacities and ultimately, capture investors’ attention.
In conclusion, many pieces of research imply that the practice in CER can
indeed reduce the risk level, stimulate innovation activities, and improve corporate
reputation, thereby exerting a positive impact among investors and increasing
investors’ purchase intention. Consistent with this, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 ： CER information disclosure can have positive impacts on
investor response.
However, with the improvement of environmental protection awareness and the
5

requirements for meeting worldwide emission reduction targets under the Paris
Agreement, China has committed to achieving its carbon emissions peak before
2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060. Under this circumstance, companies are
under greater pressure and environmental cost, which may have negative impacts on
their business operations and financial performance. Much of the research that
incorporates environmental behaviors also demonstrated that CER information
disclosure can have negative effects on investors’ decisions (Li et al., 2017;
Verbeeten et al., 2016; Deswanto and Siregar,2018).
Firstly, companies have to bear high costs when engaging in environmental
behaviors (Ervin et al., 2013; Wu, 2014; Brouwers et al., 2018). The environmental
responsibility investment raises capital costs and labor costs, especially for small and
medium-sized enterprises (Ee et al., 2018; Gjergji et al., 2021). Besides, although
some researchers argue that environmental information disclosure can lower debt
costs and financing costs (Morrone et al., 2021; Raimo et al., 2021), the
cost-reducing effects of environmental information disclosure may only exist in
long-term liabilities, on the contrary, taking environmental responsibilities can even
inhibit corporate short-term borrowing ability (He et al., 2019). Moreover, that firms’
involvement incorporates social and environmental responsibility activities can lead
to costs stickiness, implying that it is difficult to scale down environmental costs
instantly even when the environmental activities decline (Habib and Hasen, 2016). In
other words, it will take a relatively long time for companies to benefit from the
reductions of environmental costs (Jo et al., 2015). On the other hand, researchers
have found that companies that invest in greenness cannot create firm value.
Specifically, companies are exposed to environmental violation risk when they
engage in environmental behaviors, which lead to lower valuations and thereby
decrease the purchase intention of investors (Dobler et al., 2015; Fernando et al.,
2017).
Besides, the motivator of CER disclosure may not be improving environmental
quality. We cannot deny that a chronic wave of firm scandals has weakened society’s
trust in CER over recent years (Antonetti et al., 2019). Consequently, corporate
hypocrisy has received great attention in recent academic research. Some researchers
even maintain that hypocrisy may be one of the elements of modern business.
According to socio-political theories, corporate environmental disclosure is a
function of a firm’s exposure to social and political pressure (Gray et al., 1995;
Parker, 2005; Clarkson et al., 2008). Studies show that reallocating corporate
6

resources in socially conscious ways, such as taking environmental protection
measures, can help enterprises establish an extraordinarily disciplined image and
promote interactions between companies and investors, thus improving the corporate
image and the trust of investors. Therefore, corporate behaviors, such as charity
donations and environmental protection are probably a sign of obedience to social
pressure (Jo et al., 2015; Albuquerque et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020). Furthermore,
companies that are close-to-consumer will have a greater focus on reputational
benefits. Some of them regard environmental information disclosure as a particular
business strategy to obtain the reputation of investors and society, but not intrinsic
altruism (Haddock-Fraser and Tourelle, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2012). Moreover,
researchers have demonstrated that the report content and narrative tone of CER
become the vital dimension for consumers to estimate the authenticity and reliability
of CER information disclosure. Moreno (2020) pointed out that self-promotional
tone and inauthentic information disclosure will significantly increase consumers’
skepticism about the companies, thus creating a negative impact on firm value.
Besides, in the current financial market, the CER information disclosure of many
listed companies is full of deferment and evasion, which are the two potential modes
of corporate hypocrisy. Some companies only disclose the positive efforts they have
made to environmental protection while turning a blind eye to the negative impacts
they have brought about to the environment. Hence, investors tend to exhibit
negative responses to the CER information disclosure (Christensen et al., 2020).
More importantly, the Chinese government has paid great efforts to promote
investors’ environmental awareness and support environmental-friendly behaviors of
listed companies in the current capital market. The disclosure of environmentally
detrimental conducts and illegal behaviors, such as pollutant emissions and
environmental penalties, have led some environmentalist investors to reduce the
investment intention (Flammer, 2013; Brunk and Boer, 2018). However, although
part of green investors exhibits punishment reactions to the companies that conduct
environmental unfriendly behaviors, most investors still attach great importance to
corporate financial performance but not their environmental performance and will
not pay the bill of expensive corporate environmental costs for the companies with
poor financial performance (Holm and Rikhardsson, 2008; Li et al., 2016; Espahbodi
et al., 2019). Furthermore, the phenomenon of hypocrisy does not only belong to
companies. Consumers’ investment behaviors are also not always consistent with
their initial purchase intentions. They usually overstate their willingness to support
7

socially responsible companies (Carrington et al., 2014). Therefore, investors tend to
exhibit negative responses to the companies with CER information disclosure.
From the above studies about the CER information disclosure and investor
response, we can find that investors may also exhibit negative responses to
environmental information disclosure due to high environmental costs, lack of trust
in CER, and insufficient environmental awareness. Therefore, we state the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 ： CER information disclosure can have negative impacts on
investor response.

3 Research Design
In this section, we firstly discuss the Fama-French five-factor model and the
factor definitions in Section 3.1, and then describe the data collection in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 gives a specific introduction to the variables used in the Fama-French
five-factor model and finally, Section 3.4 presents the empirical models.
3.1 Factor pricing models
3.1.1 Fama-French five-factor model
In this paper, we apply the Fama-French five-factor model put forward by Fama
and French in 2015 to measure average returns of companies’ stocks, which is the
extension and improvement of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe,
1964; Lintner, 1965) and Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993).
Extensive research has manifested the reasonability and predictability of the
Fama-French five-factor model from theory and practice (Jareno et al., 2018;
Bertomeu et al., 2018). Some researchers also found that the Fama-French
five-factor model shows the highest explanatory power of the assets returns and
consistently performs better than the three-factor model (Foye, 2018; Cox and
Britten, 2019). Furthermore, with the rapid development of the capital market in
China, investment activities are consequently strengthened due to the need for risk
management and business diversification. The market impact, company size, firm
value, investment activities, and profitability are all crucial factors to evaluate the
returns on stocks. Consequently, we adopt the Fama-French five-factor model to
calculate the expected return on each stock.
In the Fama-French five-factor model, the expected return on the stock is
8

determined by the following equation:

Rit  R ft   i  i ( Rmt  R ft )  si SMBt  hi HMLt +ri RMWt  ci CMAt   it (1)
where

Rit is the return for stock i at period t , R ft is the risk-free rate for market

portfolio assets at period t . To avoid the impact of industry characteristics on stock
returns of different industries, we apply the weighted average return of circulation
market value of different industries. Thus, Rmt is the return on circulation market
value-weighted portfolio of different industries at period t . SMBt (size factor)
represents the returns on a diversified portfolio of small stocks minus the returns on
a diversified portfolio of big stocks. HMLt (value factor) measures the difference
between the value-weighted returns on a diversified portfolio of high book-to-market
equity stocks and the value-weighted returns on a diversified portfolio of low
book-to-market equity stocks. RMWt (profitability factor) measures the difference
between the expected returns on market portfolios of robust stocks with profitability
and those with weak profitability. CMAt (investment factor) measures returns on
diversified market portfolios of the stocks with conservative and aggressive
investment activities. While i represents systematic risks,  i is the intercept term,
and

 it

is the random error term. Should the Fama-French five-factor model

perfectly fits all the variation of stock returns, the intercept term  i will be zero for
all stocks and portfolios.
However, the asset pricing model can hardly perfectly fit the variation of
returns in each stock. The intercept term can hardly be zero in most cases. Hence, the
abnormal return ( AR ) on each stock can be defined by the following formula:

ARit  ( Rit  R ft )  ( i  i ( Rmt  R ft )  si SMBt  hi HMLt +ri RMWt  ci CMAt ) (2)
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i at period t , Rit , R ft , Rmt , SMBt , HMLt ,

RMWt , CMAt ,  i and i are defined as before.
3.1.2 Factors definitions
In this paper, we apply the 2*3 sorts approach proposed by Fama and French
(2015) to calculate the average returns. The 2*3 sorts approach combines the three
factors (the market factor, the size factor, and the value factor) in the Fama-French
three-factor model with the profitability factor ( RMWt ) and investment factor ( CMAt )
proposed in the Fama-French five-factor model. In concrete, the size factor is
9

divided into small group (S) and big group (B) according to the median market value,
while the value factor is classified into three groups of a high group (H), neutral
group (N), and low group (L) according to the 30% and 70% of B/M value
percentiles. In this way, six portfolios of SH、SN、SL、BH、BN、BL are produced.
Similarly, the profitability and investment factor are divided in the same way as the
value factor. Consequently, the profitability groups of robust (R), neutral (N), or
weak (W), and the investment groups of conservative (C), neutral (N), or aggressive
(A) are generated. Thus, another twelve groups of SR、SN、SW、BR、BN、BW、
SC、SN、SA、BC、BN、BA are produced. By calculating the value-weighted average
return of each group at each period and the difference between different portfolio
returns, the four factors in the Fama-French five-factor model are constructed. The
specific factors construction method is given in Table 1.
Table 1
Factors construction method.
Groups

Factors

Factors construction method

SH  SN  SL BH  BN  BL

3
3
SR  SN  SW BR  BN  BW
SMBOP 

3
3
SC  SN  SA BC  BN  BA
SMBInv 

3
3
SMBBM  SMBOP  SMBInv
SMB 
3
SH  BH SL  BL
HML 

2
2
SR  BR SW  BW
RMW 

2
2
SC  BC SA  BA
CMA 

2
2
SMBBM 

SBM

sorts
approach
2*3

HML
RMW
CMA

3.2 Data collection
In this study, we select the companies listed on the Chinese Shenzhen and
Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2020 as a research sample. As most of the
listed companies release their annual reports and CER reports at the same time, we,
therefore, select the companies that only disclose the annual reports as our control
group to exclude the investors’ response towards the annual reports’ information.
Moreover, to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the calculation of CAR, we
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eliminate the companies under special treatment and samples within six months
before and after the IPO.
Also, we eliminate the data with too many missing values. All the data are
standardized and dimensionless, and we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1%
and 99% quantiles. After screening, this paper constructs a dataset including 34658
separate observations. Specifically, there are 3198 environmental disclosure events
released by 505 companies and 31460 annual disclosure events released by 2948
companies in our sample.
We collect environmental information data from the website of cninfo3, which
is the listed company information disclosure website designated by China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Besides, all data are collected from
authoritative Chinese databases such as the CSMAR 4 database and Chinese
Research Data Services Platform (CNRDS)5 to ensure reliability and authenticity.
3.3 Variables
3.3.1. Dependent variable: CAR
The impact of information disclosure on investor response is directly reflected
in the variability in stock price (Flammer, 2013). Many pieces of research have
demonstrated that the variation in stock yield can be applied to evaluate the effects
of corporate information disclosure on investor response (Mayberry, 2020; Marhfor,
2020). Positive investor response may increase the price premium and trigger a
rising trend of the stock price, while negative investor response would reduce the
purchase intention and depress the stock price.
Therefore, the dependent variable in our research is the aggregate abnormal
return ( CARit ) of each stock, which is defined as the aggregation of the difference
between the actual and expected returns and can reflect the volatility in stock value
during the event window period. Furthermore, in terms of the research method, we
apply the event study approach (Konar and Cohen, 1997; Dasgupta et al., 2006) to
see the extent to which investors react to the disclosure of CER. The event day is
the date that the company discloses its annual report, CER report, and CSR report,
while the event window is set as eleven days of trading before and after the event

3
4
5

Data resource: http://www.cninfo.com.cn
Data resource: https://www.gtarsc.com
Data resource: https://www.cnrds.com
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day (-5,5), which is a relatively long event window to calculate the expected return.
Besides, 90 trading days is used to estimate the coefficients in our pricing model
(Miyajima and Yafeh, 2007). Specifically, the CAR is calculated as follows:

Rit  R ft   i  i ( Rmt  R ft )  si SMBt  hi HMLt +ri RMWt  ci CMAt   it
t  [100, 11], i  1, 2,...N (3)












The regression model (3) provides the estimator  i ,  i , si , hi , ri , and ci during
the estimation window, which can be used to measure the abnormal return during
the event window. Thus, the abnormal return during the event window can be
calculated by the difference between the realized return and the expected return:












ARit  ( Rit  R ft )  (i   i ( Rmt  R ft )  si SMBt  hi HMLt + ri RMWt  ci CMAt )
t  [t1 , t2 ] (4)

where t1 and t2 represent the beginning and the end of the event window,
respectively. In this paper, we define the event window as [-5, 5], that is, five days
before and five days after the environmental information disclosure. The cumulative
abnormal return ( CARit ) represents the cumulative influence of an event over the
event window period by summing up the abnormal returns from the time t1 to t2 :

CARit  CARi (t1 ,t2 )  tt12 ARit , where t  [t1 , t2 ] (5)
3.3.2. Independent variables: CER
This study uses dummy variables ( CERit ) to represent the disclosure of
environmental information. If the company discloses the environmental information
and social responsibility reports at year t, the independent variable ( CERit ) is set to 1.
If the company only discloses the annual report but does not disclose the
environmental information and social responsibility reports at year t, then the
independent variable ( CERit ) is set to 0.
3.3.3. Control variables
Except for the environmental information variable, several other variables may
influence variation in the firm value of the listed companies. Referring to the studies
of Kahn and Siddiqui (2013) and Mayberry (2020) on CER and stock price, this
study selects some variables as control variables in the empirical model. The control
variables include total assets (Asset), leverage (Lev), return on equity (ROE),
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operating profit ratio (OPR), the ratio of institutional shareholding (Ihld), earnings
per share (EPS), the shareholding ratio of top 10 shareholders (Shrholder10), the
shareholding ratio of directors, supervisors, management (Dsmhld), the numbers of
directors (Drcnum), the proportion of independent directors (Indrcrat), and the
corporate ownership (SOE). The control variables can reflect the overall financial
condition, ownership concentration, and management situation of a company.
Specifically, the control variables are defined as follows:
(1) Total assets (Asset) is expressed as the logarithm of the total assets of the
company.
(2) Leverage (Lev) is expressed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
(3) Return on assets (ROE) is expressed as the ratio of net profit to equity.
(4) The operating profit ratio (OPR) is expressed as the ratio of operating profit
to operating revenue.
(5) The ratio of institutional shareholding (Ihld) is expressed as the ratio of
shares held by institutional investors to circulation shares.
(6) Earnings per share (EPS) is expressed as the sum of profit available to
ordinary shareholders.
(7) The shareholding ratio of the top 10 shareholders (Shrholder10) reflects the
ownership concentration of the company.
(8) The shareholding ratio of directors, supervisors, management (Dsmhld)
describes the ratio of shareholding ratio of directors, supervisors, management of the
company.
(9) The numbers of directors (Drcnum) describe the scale of the directors of the
company.
(10) The proportion of independent directors (Indrcrat) describes the
proportion
of independent directors of the company.
(11) Corporate ownership (SOE) describes corporate ownership. SOE is set to 1
if the company is a state-owned company, while it is set to zero if not.
Table 2 shows the details of these variables.
Table 2
Description of all variables.
Types

Variables

Symbols

Definitions
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It is defined as the difference between the actual
Dependent

Cumulative

variable

abnormal return

CAR

and expected returns and can reflect the volatility in
stock value.

The disclosure

It is set to one if the company has disclosed

Independent
of environmental

CER

environmental information, while it is set to zero if

variables
information.

not.

Total assets

Asset

The logarithm of the total assets of the company.

Leverage

Lev

The ratio of total liabilities to total assets.

Return on equity

ROE

The ratio of net profit to equity.

OPR

The ratio of operating profit to operating revenue.

Operating profit
ratio
Institutional

The ratio of shares held by institutional investors to
Ihld

shareholding
Control

circulation shares.

Earnings

The sum of profit available to ordinary
EPS

variables

per share

shareholders.

Shareholding

The shareholding ratio of the top 10 shareholders of
Shrholder10

ratio

the company

Management

The ratio of shareholding ratio of directors,
Dsmhld

shareholding
Directors

supervisors, management of the company.
Drcnum

The numbers of directors of the company.

Independent

The proportion of independent directors of the
Indrcrat

directors

company.

Corporate

It is set to one if the company is a state-owned
SOE

Ownership

company, while it is set to zero if not.

3.4 Empirical models
According to the literature review in Section 2, CER information disclosure
may have positive effects on investors by reducing the risk level, facilitating
innovation activities, and improving corporate reputation. Also, it can bring negative
investor response because of high environmental costs, lack of trust in CER, and
insufficient environmental awareness of investors. To examine our hypotheses, we
construct the following regression model (6):

CARit   0  1CERit   X it  i   t  omt  dowt   it

(6)

where CERit represents corporate CER information disclosure. CERit is set to 1 if
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the company i disclosure environmental information at time t, while it is set to 0 if
the company i only disclose the annual reports. X it is the control variables which
include the total assets (Asset), leverage (Lev), return on equity (ROE), operating
profit ratio (OPR, unit: %), the ratio of institutional shareholding (Ihld, unit: %),
earnings per share (EPS), shareholding ratio of top 10 shareholders (Shrholder10),
the ratio of shareholding ratio of directors, supervisors, management (Dsmhld,
unit: %), the numbers of directors (Drcnum), the proportion of independent directors
(Indrcrat, unit: %), and the corporate ownership (SOE). 1 is the key parameter
that reflects the change of stock price before and after the environmrntal information
disclosure.  0 is the intercept term. i is the firm fixed effect,  t is the year fixed
effect. Moreover, the previous discussions have demonstrated that disclosure timing
impacts informational differences across investors so that the publishing time of the
annual report and environmental information will also have a significant influence
on investors (Choudhary et al., 2015; Edmonds et al., 2017). Thus, we control the
fixed effects for weeks-of-the-month ( womt ) and days-of-the-week ( dowt ) to avoid
the extra influence induced by publishing time.

 it is

the random error. Besides,

standard errors were clustered at the industry level.

4 Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and sample comparisons
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the research sample. Table 4 and Table
5 provide the CAR significance of different groups and the sample comparisons,
respectively. From Table 3, we can see that CAR of all listed companies is 0.070,
indicating that companies that disclose the annual report or environmental report
tend to have a positive return. Moreover, the results of Table 4 have demonstrated
that companies that disclose CER information and the ones that only disclose annual
reports all have significant positive CAR, however, the former has a lower return
compared to the latter. We further compared the CAR of the two different groups in
Table 5 and find that the CAR of the companies that disclose CER information is
lower than the ones that only disclose annual reports at the 1% significant level.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of all variables.
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Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

CAR

34,658

0.070

0.103

-0.201

0.458

CER

34,658

0.092

0.289

0

1

Asset

34,658

22.075

1.372

19.623

27.139

Lev

34,658

0.444

0.212

0.051

0.945

Roe

34,658

6.082

13.800

-79.74

35.72

OPR

34,658

8.292

18.948

-95.89

60.05

Ihld

34,658

34.933

24.621

0.01

88

EPS

34,658

0.361

0.523

-1.3

2.54

Shrholder10

34,658

0.592

0.151

0.233

0.911

Dsmhld

34,658

5.083

12.015

0

57.474

Drcnum

34,658

9.657

2.757

4

19

Indrcrat

34,658

38.382

9.564

0

66.667

SOE

34,658

0.436

0.496

0

1

Table 4
The significance of CAR in different groups.
Variable

Treatment

Contorl

0.065***

0.070***

(38.85)

(120.68)

3198

31460

CAR
Observations

Note:

*** **

,

*

and are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.
Table 5
Sample comparisons.
Treatment

Control

Variable

MeanDiff
Obs

Mean

Obs

Mean

CAR

3198

0.065

31460

0.070

-0.006***

Asset

3198

22.868

31460

21.994

0.874***

Lev

3198

0.455

31460

0.443

0.013***

Roe

3198

8.635

31460

5.823

2.812***

OPR

3198

11.550

31460

7.960

3.590***

Ihld

3198

44.162

31460

33.995

10.167***

EPS

3198

0.515

31460

0.345

0.170***

Shrholder10

3198

0.583

31460

0.592

-0.009***
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Dsmhld

3198

4.748

31460

5.117

-0.369*

Drcnum

3198

10.031

31460

9.619

0.412***

Indrcrat

3198

39.050

31460

38.314

-0.737***

SOE

3198

0.448

31460

0.434

0.013

Note: ***, ** and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Furthermore, we analyze the change of CAR of the companies that disclose
environmental information compared to the ones that only disclose annual reports
using the event study method. Specifically, we apply the following model to observe
the investor response towards environmental information disclosure during the event
window:
5

ARit   0   1CERit   X it  i   t   omt  dowt   it (7)
t 5

where t represents each day during the event window, ARit represents the abnormal
return of each day during the event window, and other variable definitions are the
same as the model (6). The results are shown in Fig. 1. We can find that before the
environmental information disclosure, the confidence intervals of all coefficients
contain zero and we cannot refuse the hypothesis that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero, which indicates that there exist no significant
differences in market reaction between the two different groups of companies.
However, the coefficients are significantly negative on the third day and fourth day
after the environmental information disclosure, which implies that companies that
disclose environmental may induce lower market return and relatively negative
investor response.
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Fig. 1 The change of CAR relative to the time of environmental information disclosure

4.2. The regression results of CER information disclosure
Table 6 shows the regression results of the impact of CER information
disclosure on investor response. We control the firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects to control the missing variables that cannot be observed. Moreover, we
control the weeks-of-the-month fixed effects and days-of-the-week fixed effects to
eliminate the influence of releasing time on investors. Control variables in Table 6
refer to all the control variables in Table 2. We can find that the estimated coefficient
of column (1) is -0.010 and the estimated coefficient of column (2) is -0.008, which
indicates that the disclosure of environmental information will reduce the corporate
market return by 1% and 0.8%, respectively. The results are significant at the 1%
level. According to the regression results, we can say that environmental information
disclosure is found to exert a negative impact on stock return compared to the
companies that only disclose annual reports.
These results reveal the investors’ behavior when facing CER information
disclosure and provide persuasive evidence to Hypotheses 2. Although companies
always obtain positive reactions when publishing environmental information,
however, we draw a totally different conclusion when we eliminate the impacts of
disclosing annual reports, that is, investors can be negatively affected when
companies disclose environmental information compared to the ones that only
disclose annual reports.
Table 6
The impacts of the CER information disclosure on the investor response.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.010***

-0.008***

(-5.50)

(-3.62)

0.071***

0.214***

(405.64)

(4.24)

Control variables

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Variables

CER

Constant
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Note:

Observations

34,658

34,658

R2

0.160

0.162

*** **

,

*

and are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

4.3 Robustness test
4.3.1 Capital asset pricing model
As is discussed in Section 3.1, various asset pricing models have been
developed to explain stock returns. Hence, the regression results may be sensitive to
the selection of the pricing model. Consequently, in this subsection, we apply the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to construct the robustness test to further
improve the robustness of our conclusions.
The CAPM is defined as follow：

Rit  R ft   i  i ( Rmt  R ft )   it

(8)

where Rit is the return for stock i at period t , R ft is the risk-free rate for
market portfolio assets at period t , Rmt is the return on value-weighted portfolio at
period t , i represents systematic risks,

i

is the intercept term, and

 it

is the

random error term. Therefore, the abnormal return ( ARit ) on each stock can be
defined by the following formula:

ARit  ( Rit  R ft )  ( i  i ( Rmt  R ft )) (9)
Thus, we can get the result of the abnormal returns of each stock. The
regression results of CER information disclosure on the stock return calculated by
CAPM are provided in Table 7. Column (1) and column (2) in Table 7 give the
regression results on the impact of environmental information disclosure on the
investor response.
The estimated coefficient of column (1) is -0.009 and the estimated coefficient
of column (2) is -0.007, respectively. The results are significant at the 1% level. We
can find that the results are consistent with the results in Table 6 whether to consider
the control variables or not. Environmental information disclosure is proved to have
negative effects on investors. Thus, we can find that there do not exist significant
differences compared to the results in Table 6. These results indicate that the setting
of pricing models has little influence on the abnormal return of the stocks, which
further suggests the robustness of the calculation of the abnormal return on stocks.
Table 7
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The impacts of the CER information disclosure on the investor response calculated by CAPM.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.009***

-0.007**

(-3.40)

(-2.36)

0.067***

0.194***

(280.36)

(4.72)

Control variable

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

34,658

34,658

R2

0.178

0.180

Variables

CER

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

4.3.2 Alternative event window
In this paper, we apply the event study method to calculate CAR. As we have
discussed before, the event window is set as eleven days (-5,5) of trading before and
after the event day. Thus, the selection of event window may also influence the
results of CAR, thereby affecting the regression results (Jong et al., 2014; Choudhary
et al., 2015). We therefore select seven days of trading before and after the event day
(-3,3) as an alternative event window in this subsection to calculate the CAR of
listed companies. The regression results of the CER information disclosure on the
stock return using the new event window are shown in Table 8.
The estimated coefficient of column (1) is -0.004 and the estimated coefficient
of column (2) is -0.003 and the results are significant at the significant levels of 1%
and 10%, respectively. The CER information disclosure still exhibits negative effects
on investors, although there is a decrease in the significance level of the coefficient
in column (2). Thus, we can find that there do not exist significant differences
compared to the results in Table 6. These results indicate that the selection of event
window also has little influence on the market return, which further suggests the
robustness of the calculation of the abnormal return on stocks.
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Table 8
The impacts of the CER information disclosure on the investor response under different event
windows.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.004***

-0.003*

(-3.62)

(-1.93)

0.044***

0.132***

(430.05)

(3.26)

Control variable

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

34,658

34,658

R2

0.141

0.142

Variables

CER

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics

4.3.3 Propensity score matching
From Table 4 we can see that there exist significant differences in terms of the
characteristics between the companies that disclose environmental information and
the ones that only disclose annual reports. The selection bias of our sample may lead
to the inaccuracy of the regression results. Consequently, we apply propensity score
matching (PSM) to solve this problem, which places the samples into a nonrandom
assignment and thus controls self-selection biases and causal interferences
(Wellalage and Fernandez, 2019; Cole et al., 2021). Specifically, we apply the logit
model and the nearest neighbors matching method. We match the sample by year and
industry.
The covariates we used of PSM are shown in Table 9. Specifically, the
covariates include total assets (Asset), capital expenditure (Capexp, unit: CNY),
leverage (Lev), return on assets (ROA), cash flow (CF, unit: CNY), the ratio of
institutional shareholding (Ihld, unit:%), the shareholding ratio of the top 10
shareholders (Shrholder10), the numbers of directors (Drcnum), the proportion of
independent directors (Indrcrat, unit: %), listed age of companies (Lst_age), and the
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corporate ownership (SOE).
The results of the balancing assumption test of PSM are shown in Table A1.
Besides, Fig. A1 and Fig. A2 show the standardized bias across covariates and the
kernel density before and after matching, respectively. The balancing assumption test
results and the change of standardized bias and kernel density before and after
matching all demonstrated that the bias of the treatment group and control group
have been reduced greatly after matching.
Table 9
Description of PSM covariates.
Variable

Symbols

Definitions

Total assets

Asset

The logarithm of total assets of the company.

Capital expenditure

Capexp

The amount of capital expenditure of the company.

Leverage

Lev

The ratio of total liabilities to total assets.

Return on asset

ROA

The ratio of net profit to the asset.

Cash flow

CF

The size of the cash flow of the company.

Institutional shareholding

Ihld

The ratio of shares held by institutional investors to
circulation shares.
The Shareholding ratio of the top 10 shareholders of the
Shareholding

Shrholder10
company

Directors

Drcnum

The numbers of directors of the company.

Independent directors

Indrcrat

The proportion of independent directors of the company.

Listed Age

Lst_age

The time since the company went public.

Ownership property

SOE

SOE is set to 1 if the company is state-owned, or it is set to 0.

The regression results after matching are shown in Table 10. The estimated
coefficient of column (1) is -0.009 and the estimated coefficient of column (2) is
-0.006 The results are both significant at the 1% significant level. We can find that
there do not exist significant differences compared to the results in Table 6. The CER
information disclosure still exhibits negative effects on investors after matching the
suitable control group. These results indicate that the negative response of investors
towards the environmental information disclosure is still robust after we eliminate
the selection bias of our sample, which further suggests the robustness of our
regression results.
Table 10
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The impacts of the CER information disclosure on the investor response after PSM.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.009***

-0.006***

(-6.52)

(-3.70)

0.073***

0.214***

(237.70)

(5.20)

Control variable

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

11,782

11,782

R2

0.247

0.249

Variables

CER

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

4.3.4 Placebo test
Although we have controlled the systematic differences by controlling
corporate characteristic variables such as total asset, leverage, and ROE, there may
still exit unobservable factors that will interfere with the regression results (Wei and
He, 2021). Therefore, we apply the placebo test to construct a series of
counterfactual tests that makes contrary assumptions about the impact of a policy or
event to examine the robustness of the regression results. If the impact of
environmental information disclosure on investor response is still negatively
significant under the counterfactual conditions, it means that the negative impacts
come from the unobservable factors, but not from the disclosure of environmental
information.
Specifically, we use bootstrap to randomly select the disclosure date of
environmental information for each company, and repeat the experiments 10000
times according to model (6). The regression results are reported in Fig.2. The
dashed line in Fig.2 represents the real regression coefficient of the model (6). We
can find that the estimator of the coefficient is nearly normally distributed and
mostly around 0. Moreover, the probability of counterfactual treatment effect is
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0.005, which means that the hypothetical event may have a relatively small
probability that the regression coefficient of environmental information disclosure
will be significant. Hence, the counterfactual treatment effect of environmental
information disclosure does not exist.

Fig. 2 Bootstrap results of placebo test

5 Heterogeneity Test
5.1 Institutional shareholding
Previous studies have demonstrated that there exist great differences between
institutional investors and individual investors in terms of access to information,
investment decisions, and institutional constraints (Bailey et al., 2009; Chuang and
Susmel, 2011; Li et al., 2018). Thus, we analyze the market reaction of corporate
environmental information disclosure according to the difference of shareholding
ratio of institutional investors. The results are shown in Table 11.
Column (1) and column (2) in Table 11 show the results of the impact of CER
information disclosure on the investor response with a high institutional
shareholding ratio, while column (3) and column (4) show the results with low
institutional shareholding ratio. The estimated coefficient of column (1) is -0.015 and
the estimated coefficient of column (2) is -0.012. The results are both significant at
the 1% significant level. However, the estimated coefficients of the group with a low
institutional shareholding ratio are not significant at each significant level. More
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importantly, the results of the Chow test showed that there exist significant
differences between the two groups in regression coefficient significance.
These results indicate that the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional
investors is, the more likely companies are to be negatively affected by
environmental information disclosure. Researchers have demonstrated that
companies with green behaviors cannot create shareholder value. Institutional
investors do not regard environmental engagement as strictly value-enhancing
activities (Harjoto et al., 2015), so institutional investors tend to shun the stocks with
environmental risk exposure, thus reducing the holding shares of their stocks
(Fernando et al., 2017). Moreover, some short-term institutional investors will pay
more attention to short-term earnings, thus lacking incentives to support corporate
environmental behaviors (García-Meca1 and Pucheta-Martínez, 2018). Therefore,
institutional investors exhibit a significant negative response to CER information
disclosure. In contrast, individual investors are less sophisticated and less informed
than institutional investors (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), thus showing an
insignificant response to the environmental information disclosure.
Table 11
The impacts of CER information disclosure on investor response of companies with different
institutional shareholdings.
High
Variables

Low

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

-0.015***

-0.012***

-0.002

0.001

(-6.40)

(-5.03)

(-0.55)

(0.10)

0.073***

0.210***

0.068***

0.218***

(280.00)

(4.67)

(298.09)

(3.11)

Control variable

NO

YES

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

19,551

19,551

15,105

15,105

R2

0.147

0.148

0.178

0.181

CER

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.
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5.2 Industrial differences
According to the Environmental Information Disclosure Guidelines for Listed
Companies, sixteen industries, including steel, cement, coal, and chemicals, are
heavily polluting industries. Therefore, this paper divides our sample into heavy
polluting industries and non-heavy polluting industries and analyzes the impact of
environmental information disclosure on different industries. The results are shown
in Table 12.
Column (1) and column (2) in Table 12 show the results of the impact of CER
information disclosure on investor response of heavily polluting industries, while
column (3) and column (4) show the results of non-heavy polluting industries. The
estimated coefficient of column (1) is -0.018 and the estimated coefficient of column
(2) is -0.016. The results are both significant at the 1% significant level. However,
the estimated coefficients of non-heavy polluting industries are insignificant at each
significant level after the control variables are included in the regression model.
The results have demonstrated that the negative relationship between
environmental information disclosure and investor response is more significant in
heavily polluting industries. Heavy polluting companies are more likely to engage in
environmental protection and pollutant emissions, such as clean energy, sewage
treatment, and energy-saving projects. Consequently, they generally have higher
environmental risk exposure and environmental costs to control their pollutant
discharge. Moreover, companies may get negative reactions and be shunned by
investors whose sole objective is profit maximization once the environmental
investments that enhance the environmental responsibility exceed legal requirements
and risk management rationales (Fernando et al., 2017). Hence, the heavy polluting
companies are more easily to be negatively affected by environmental information
disclosure.
Table 12
The impacts of CER information disclosure on investor response of companies in different
industries.
Heavy polluting industries
Variables

Non-heavy polluting industries

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

CAR

CAR

CAR

CAR

-0.018***

-0.016**

-0.007*

-0.004

(-10.14)

(-5.47)

(-1.98)

(-0.96)

CER
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0.072***

0.193

0.070***

0.217***

(384.24)

(2.67)

(237.00)

(4.02)

Control variable

NO

YES

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

10,242

10,242

24,414

24,414

0.150

0.152

0.168

0.170

Constant

R2

Note:

*** **

,

*

and are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

5.3 Policy impact
The Ambient Air Quality Standard was revised in 2012 by China Ministry of
Environmental Protection, and the air quality index for monitoring fine particulate
matter (PM2.5) was added. After that, the whole society began to attach great
importance to air quality and corporate pollution behaviors (Xing et al., 2019). Thus,
we divide our sample into two groups according to the time when the policy of
AAQS has been implemented. The regression results are shown in Table 13.
Column (1) and column (2) in Table 13 show the results of the impact of CER
information disclosure on the investor response before and after the AAQS has been
implemented. The estimated coefficient of column (1) is -0.007, but not significant.
However, the estimated coefficient of column (2) is -0.007 and it is significant at the
5% significant level. These results have implied that the negative relationship
between environmental information disclosure and investor response is significant
after the AAQS policy has been implemented. The companies have to bear higher
environmental expenditure and face a higher risk of environmental violation under
more strict environmental regulation, thereby reducing their competitiveness in the
capital market.
Table 13
The impacts of CER information disclosure on the stock price before and after the AAQS policy.
(1)

(2)

Year before 2012

Year after 2012

-0.007

-0.007**

Variables
CER
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(-1.35)

(-2.21)

0.368***

0.328***

(4.72)

(5.17)

Control variable

YES

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

12,415

22,011

R2

0.187

0.210

Constant

Note:

*** **

,

*

and are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

6 Influential Mechanisms
6.1 Environmental cost
We have discussed in Section 2 that high environmental costs can have negative
impacts on investor response. Consequently, to further confirm the influence of
environmental cost of the listed company and investor response, we construct the
following model:
CARit   0  1CERit   2 costit   3CERit * costit   X it  i   t  omt  dowt   it (10)

where costit represents the environmental cost of the listed companies and other
variable definitions are the same as the model (6). 3 is the key coefficient to
analyze the impacts of environmental cost in affecting environmental information
disclosure and investor response. In our research, we use environmental expenditure
and pollution fees to measure environmental costs. Specifically, environmental
expenditure refers to the environmental protection investment, greening cost, and
environmental taxes. While pollution fees refer to the cost of discharging pollutants.
The data are collected from corporate annual reports, CER reports, and CSR reports.
The results of the impact of environmental cost on investor response to
environmental information disclosure are shown in Table 14. The estimated
coefficient of the interaction term in column (1) and column (2) is -0.015 and -0.013,
which are significant at the 1% significant level and the 5% significant level,
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respectively. These results have implied that companies with higher environmental
costs will indeed have lower market returns and negative investor responses when
disclosing environmental information. Companies have to bear the raised capital cost
and labor costs when engaging in environmental activities. More importantly, the
scale of environmental costs is difficult to cut down in short-term and it usually takes
a long time for companies to benefit from environmental expenditure (Jo et al., 2015;
Habib and Hasen, 2016; Gjergji et al., 2021), thus reducing the purchase intention of
investors.
Table 14
The impacts of environmental cost in affecting environmental information disclosure and
investor response.
(1)

(2)

environmental expenditure

pollution fees

-0.008***

-0.008***

(-3.63)

(-3.42)

-0.002**

-0.019***

(-2.35)

(-2.92)

-0.015***

-0.013**

(-4.39)

(-2.47)

0.214***

0.212***

(4.26)

(4.25)

Control variable

YES

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

34,658

34,658

R2

0.162

0.162

Variables

CER

cost

CER* cost

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

6.2 Environmental regulation
Companies that disclose environmental information have to bear tremendous
pressure under strict environmental regulation, not only do they have to accept the
environmental penalties but also face the damage of corporate image once the
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environmental performance does not meet public expectations (Chen et al., 2019).
This section, therefore, analyzes the impact of environmental regulation on investor
response towards corporate environmental information disclosure.
We construct the environmental regulation intensity index to analyze the
impacts of CER information disclosure on investor response (Wu et al., 2020).
Specifically, we construct the environmental regulation intensity index ( ERit ) by
using the industrial sulfur dioxide removal rate and industrial dust removal rate at
the city level. Firstly, we standardize the industrial sulfur dioxide removal rate and
industrial dust removal rate:

pollutantij - min(pollutantij )

pollutantij =
where

pollutantij

max(pollutantij ) - min(pollutantij )

(11)

represents the removal rate of pollution j of city i,

min(pollutantij ) and max(pollutantij ) represent the minimum and maximum of

pollution j of city i. Then we can get the pollution weight of each city:

wij 

pollutantij



i

pollutantij

/

gdpi
 i gdpi

(12)

where pollutantij /  i pollutantij represents the proportion of pollutant j of the
city i to the pollutant j in the whole country, while gdpi /  i gdpi represents the
GDP of the city i to the national GDP, and the weight value wij is the ratio of the
two proportions. Finally, we get the environmental regulation intensity index ( ERit )
of city i:
ERit   2j 1wij pollutant / 2

(13)

To analyze the influence of environmental regulation on investor response, we
construct the following model:

CARit   0  1CERit   2 ERit  3CERit * ERit   X it  i   t  omt  dowt   it
(14)
where ERit represents the intensity of environmental regulation and other variables’
definitions are the same as the model (6). 3 is the key parameter we focus on. The
regression results are shown in Table 17. We lose some observations because the
data of ERit are missed in several years.
Table 15 shows the results of the impact of environmental regulation on
investor response towards corporate environmental information disclosure. The
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estimated coefficient of the interaction term in column (1) and column (2) is -0.083
and -0.078, respectively, which are both significant at the 1% significant level. These
results have implied that strict environmental regulation can aggravate investors’
negative response to environmental information. The announcement and
implementation of environmental regulation can bring closer investor attention to
environmental information disclosure (Guo et al., 2019). Moreover, strict
environmental regulation requires companies to disclose their environmental
information in reality and detail, thus bringing additional expenditure to listed
companies and violating the objective purpose of firms to maximize profits.
Therefore, environmental policies may significantly hurt investors’ investment
returns of listed companies reduce their investment intention (Palmer et al., 1995;
Ramiah et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2020).
Table 15
The impacts of environmental regulation on CER information disclosure and investor response.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.012**

-0.009**

(-2.73)

(-2.15)

-0.006

-0.009

(-0.37)

(-0.46)

-0.083***

-0.078***

(-3.24)

(-3.15)

0.092***

0.289***

(280.37)

(4.31)

Control variable

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

16,546

16,546

R2

0.170

0.172

Variables

CER

ER

CER*ER

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

31

6.3 Political connection
Political connection is proved to have a significant impact on corporate
environmental information disclosure and environmental performance. Companies
can benefit from the political connection by reducing information asymmetry and
discrimination in accessing political resources, such as political subsidies, tax breaks,
and financing constraints (Yao and Xu, 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Dai and Cheng,
2015;). Moreover, companies with stronger political connections have more
incentive to disclose environmental information and better environmental
performance (Lin et al., 2015; Zhang, 2017). To further analyze the influence of
political connection of the listed company on investor response, we construct the
following model:
CARit   0  1CERit   2 politicalit  3CERit * politicalit   X it  i   t  omt  dowt   it

(15)
where politicalit represents the political connection of the listed companies and
other variable definitions are the same as the model (6). We use the ratio of corporate
government subsidies to operating revenue to measure the political connection.
Specifically, the politicalit is defined as follows:
politicalit 

Subsidyit
(16)
Operation _ Revenue it

Table 16 shows the results of the impact of political connection on investor
response to corporate environmental information disclosure. The estimated
coefficients of the interaction term in column (1) and column (2) are 0.073 and 0.068,
respectively, which are both significant at the 1% significant level. These results
have implied that political connection can alleviate the negative response of
investors to environmental information. For one thing, the strong political
connection can alleviate the financing constraints and reduce the environmental
violation risk of some listed companies, enabling investors to have more confidence
in the operating activities and future development (Li et al., 2019; Farag and
Dickinson, 2020). For another, politically connected companies are more likely to
obtain green subsidies than non-connected firms (Lin et al., 2015). Furthermore,
political connections enable companies to have more tax reduction and corporate tax
avoidance activities (Zhang, 2017; Yu et al., 2021b). All these factors can cut down
corporate environmental costs and thus have positive impacts on investors.
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Table 16
The impacts of political connection on CER information disclosure and investor response.
(1)

(2)

CAR

CAR

-0.011***

-0.008***

(-4.40)

(-3.27)

0.032*

0.034*

(1.87)

(1.94)

0.073**

0.068**

(2.40)

(2.24)

0.070***

0.267***

(288.51)

(5.73)

Control variable

NO

YES

Company FE

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

Weeks-of-the-month FE

YES

YES

Days-of-the-week FE

YES

YES

Observations

24,137

24,137

R2

0.194

0.196

Variables

CER

political

CER*political

Constant

Note: ***,

**

and * are respectively significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, and in () are t-

statistics.

7 Conclusions
In recent years, with the growing public concerns on environmental and social
issues, corporate environmental responsibility (CER) has aroused widespread
attention from academics. Accordingly, the influences of CER information disclosure
on corporate sustainable development have become one of the critical subjects in the
relevant field. This study, therefore, explores the impacts of CER information
disclosure from the perspective of investors. We collect a relatively comprehensive
sample of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2020 to analyze the impact of
environmental information disclosure on investor response. Moreover, we control
the influences of corporate annual reports and the releasing time on investors in our
regression model. On these basis, we apply the Fama-French five-factor model,
which shows the highest explanatory power of the assets returns to measure the
abnormal return on each stock of the listed coal companies.
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Based on the above discussion, we have found that companies that disclose
environmental information can receive a positive investor response. However, when
we consider the impact of the corporate annual reports, we can see that the
companies that disclose environmental information obtain a significantly lower
market return compared to those that only disclose annual reports, indicating that
investors tend to exhibit a negative response to environmental information disclosure.
The results are robust after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, we find that
companies with higher institutional shareholding can have a significant negative
response to environmental information, as institutional investors do not regard
environmental engagement as strictly value-enhancing activities and are inclined to
shun the stocks with environmental risk exposure compared to individual investors.
Besides, heavy polluting companies are more likely to engage in environmental
protection and pollutant emission, which will incur higher environmental risk
exposure and environmental costs to control its pollutant discharge. Hence, such
companies may get negative reactions from investors whose sole objective is profit
maximization. Moreover, the negative effects are found significant after the AAQS
policy was implemented in 2012, as the policy results in higher environmental
expenditure and face higher environmental violation risk. Furthermore, this paper
explores the influential mechanisms and confirms that costly environmental
expenditure and strict environmental regulation will result in a negative investor
response, while the stronger political connection can alleviate the negative impacts
of environmental information disclosure.
Our findings suggest important policy implications. Firstly, the results of this
paper have demonstrated that investors tend to exhibit a negative response to
corporate environmental information disclosure, thus making companies lack the
incentive to disclose environmental information. However, government subsidies can
alleviate the negative reaction of investors. Hence, for one thing, the government
should increase the supervision of corporate environmental behaviors and formulate
mandatory environmental information disclosure policy, especially for heavily
polluting industries. For another, the government could support the environmental
policy and give financial support to help environmental-friendly companies to cut
down the environmental costs and environmental violation risk, thus encouraging the
companies to undertake the environmental responsibility voluntarily. Also, the
government should supervise the corporate environmental behaviors and strengthen
punishment of environmental violations (Li, et al., 2016), so as to jointly achieve the
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purpose of regulating corporate environmental behavior through administrative
punishment and investor response.
Second, our findings suggest that strong environmental regulation and
expensive environmental expenditure will aggravate the negative response of
investors to environmental information disclosure. Therefore, companies should
focus on promoting environmentally innovative activities and improving production
methods. To participate in CER management, new products or new technology is
needed to meet with environmental protection targets, thereby promoting corporate
technological progress and cost-saving innovations (Horbach, 2012; Kraus et al.,
2020). Hence, engaging in technological innovation activities can increase the
productivity of the company and cover the cost of environmental protection
measures, thus improving the profitability and presenting better financial
performance to investors. Besides, companies should also pay attention to improving
the structure of investors and alleviate the negative reactions from institutional
investors to environmental information.
Finally, the environmental awareness of investors should be improved. The
conclusions above have indicated that most investors are inclined to neglect the
efforts of the companies to improve the environment. Moreover, they still pay close
attention to corporate financial performance and regard the environmental behaviors
as nonprofitable behavior, thus presenting a negative response to environmental
disclosure, which suggests the lack of environmental awareness of investors.
Consequently, the government should continue to formulate policies on
environmental administrative penalties and support the companies that engage in
environmental management (Bae and Yu, 2018), and make investors realize the
long-term benefit of environmental behaviors, thereby improving the corporate
image and brand value of the environmental-friendly companies.
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Appendix
Table A1
Balancing assumption test of PSM covariates.
Variable

Matched

Asset

Unmatched

22.425

22.004

29.6

Matched

22.392

22.404

-0.9

Unmatched

77.216

82.150

-0.9

Matched

65.328

61.881

0.6

Unmatched

0.457

0.448

2.7

Matched

0.440

0.443

-1.0

Unmatched

4.477

3.470

5.9

Matched

4.828

5.027

-1.2

Unmatched

-29.444

5.544

-4.2

Matched

-12.596

-16.996

0.5

Unmatched

37.738

34.069

14.8

Matched

37.967

38.154

-0.8

Unmatched

0.586

0.595

-5.5

Matched

0.586

0.586

0.1

Unmatched

9.741

9.633

3.8

Matched

9.697

9.679

0.6

Unmatched

38.747

38.350

4.1

Matched

38.735

38.574

1.7

Unmatched

16.292

15.074

16.7

Matched

16.004

16.150

-2.0

Unmatched

0.432

0.435

-0.7

Matched

0.434

0.440

-1.2

Capexp

Lev

ROA

CF

Ihld

Shrholder10

Drcnum

Indrcrat

Lst_age

SOE

Treated

Control
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%bias

%reduct bias

97.1

30.1

63.4

80.2

87.4

94.9

97.5

83.3

59.6

88.0

-68.5

t-test

p-value

20.99

0.000

-0.46

0.644

-0.52

0.602

1.09

0.276

1.76

0.079

-0.83

0.405

3.55

0.000

-0.57

0.572

-2.54

0.011

0.59

0.553

10.44

0.000

-0.39

0.697

-3.85

0.000

0.07

0.943

2.70

0.007

0.33

0.740

2.90

0.004

0.86

0.392

11.22

0.000

-1.11

0.268

-0.49

0.623

-0.60

0.549

Fig.A1 Standardized bias across covariates before and after matching

Fig.A2 Kernel density before and after matching
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